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MGM Mirage v. Nevada Ins. Guaranty Ass’n., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22
(June 25, 2009) 1
INSURANCE LAW – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Summary
Appeal from a district court order holding that self-insured employers under Nevada’s
Workers’ Compensation Act can not seek reimbursement from the Nevada Insurance Guaranty
Association for amounts that should have been paid by appellant’s insolvent excess insurance
carrier.
Disposition/Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that appellants, MGM Mirage and Steel
Engineers, Inc., are not insurers for purposes of the Nevada Insurance Guaranty Association Act.
As a result, self-insured employers under the Workers’ Compensation Act are not barred from
recovering payment from the Nevada Insurance Guaranty Association for covered workers’
compensation claims payable by their insolvent excess insurance carrier.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellants MGM Mirage and Steel Engineers, Inc. (MGM and SEI), are employers in the
state of Nevada who operate as self-insured employers. Both employers contracted with
Reliance National Insurance Company for their excess insurance policies. In October 2001, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania declared Reliance Insurance Company, including
Reliance National Insurance Company, insolvent and entered an order of liquidation. MGM and
SEI were required to pay workers’ compensation funds to employees whose claims were pending
at the time Reliance became insolvent. Under NRS 687A.060, the Nevada Insurance Guaranty
Association (NIGA) is responsible for paying insolvent insurers’ unpaid covered claims. NIGA
filed a complaint in district court seeking a declaration of the term “insurer” under the NIGA Act
to determine whether MGM and SEI fell within the NIGA Act’s definition of “insurer,” which
would place MGM and SEI’s claims outside the scope of “covered claims” under the NIGA Act
and prohibit NIGA from paying the claims.
The district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because there were
no factual disputes and the sole issue presented was one of statutory construction. The court
determined that the definition of “insurer” under NRS 616A.270 of the Workers Compensation
Act must be read consistently with the NIGA Act. Furthermore, the court determined that the
Workers’ Compensation Act’s definition of “insurer” was applicable to the NIGA Act and that
MGM and SEI were insurers under the NIGA Act. As a result, the court held that MGM and SEI
were precluded from seeking reimbursement from NIGA. MGM and SEI appealed.
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By James Conway.

Discussion
The Court addressed the issue of whether a self-insured employer, as defined in the
Workers’ Compensation Act, qualifies as an insurer for purposes of the NIGA Act, thus
precluding recovery from the NIGA fund. The NIGA Act was enacted by Nevada’s Legislature
in order to provide limited protection for insureds in the event that their insurers become
insolvent. NIGA is a nonprofit, unincorporated, legal entity that provides insurance benefits to
individuals and entities whose insurers have become insolvent. 2 However, the Legislature
allowed employers to opt out of Nevada’s workers compensation system and self insure by
becoming liable for the claims of their injured employees. The self-insured employer must
obtain excess insurance in order to provide protection against a catastrophic loss. 3
Statutory Interpretation of NRS 687A.0332(2)(a)
The issue of whether self-insured employers constitute insurers for NIGA Act purposes is
an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court of Nevada and requires the Court to engage in
statutory interpretation. MGM and SEI argue that a plain reading of the NIGA Act demonstrates
that neither employer is an insurer and that NIGA is obligated to pay their claims as a result.
NIGA asserts that the term “insurer,” as used in the NIGA Act, is ambiguous and requires the
court to look outside the statutory scheme. NIGA further argued that because the Workers’
Compensation Act defines “insurer” to include self-insured employers, self-insured employers
are insures under the NIGA Act as well.
Plain Meaning of “Insurer” under NRS 687A.033(2)(a)
The Court noted that NRS 687A.033(a)(2) of the NIGA Act excludes coverage for claims
that are due an insurer. However, the Legislature did not define “insurer” under the NIGA Act.
The Court concluded that the term “insurer” under NRS 687A.033(a)(2) has a plain meaning and
that MGM and SEI do not fall within a reasonable connotation of the term.
The Court looked to other chapters in the Nevada Revised Statutes and the Nevada
Insurance Code for various statutory definitions of “insurer.” 4 The general provisions governing
the insurance title defines “insurer” as “every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor,
surety or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.” 5
In addition, the Court noted that other statutes in Nevada’s insurance title define “insurer”
as one that engages in the business of insurance and have defined “insurer” in the same manner
as NRS 679A.100. 6 The Court continued by stating that self-insured employers are not defined
as “insurers” anywhere in Nevada’s insurance title. The Court concluded that the Legislature’s
substantial use of “insurer” to describe persons or entities in the business of insurance militates
in favor of concluding that the NIGA Act’s reference to “insurer” plainly addresses an insurance
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company. Therefore, the plain meaning of “insurer” as applied to the NIGA Act must exclude
MGM and SEI because they are not in the business of insurance.
Further, the Court acknowledged that Reliance, not MGM or SEI, was the insurer. In
consideration for premiums paid by MGM and SEI, Reliance agreed to assume the risk of
MGM’s and SEI’s employees’ workers’ compensation claims that reached an excess beyond the
limits that they contractually agreed to. Furthermore, it was Reliance who paid into the NIGA
Act fund as a member-insurer. As a result, the court concluded that Reliance, and not MBM or
SEI, was insuring the employees’ risk of loss for those excess insurance claims.
The Court noted that this conclusion was consistent with other jurisdictions’
interpretations of statutes similar to NRS 687A.033(2)(a). The majority of those states that have
considered the precise issue of whether self-insured employers are insurers under their Insurance
Guaranty Association Acts have held that self-insurers are not insurers for Insurance Guaranty
Association Act purposes. 7 In addition, the Court held that its conclusion that employers are not
insurers under the NIGA Act is in harmony with Nevada’s workers’ compensation laws.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that, because the plain meaning of “insurer”
necessarily denotes a person or entity that is in the insurance business, self-insured employers are
not insurers under the NIGA Act. Therefore, appellants MGM and SEI, as self-insured
employers, may recover payment from NIGA for their workers’ compensation claims that are
“covered claims.” The Court noted that this conclusion is supported by a majority of
jurisdictions’ interpretations of their guaranty acts and is in harmony with Nevada’s workers’
compensation law. The district court’s order was reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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See, e.g., Doucette v. Pomes, 724 A.2d 481, 489-91 (Conn. 1999) (holding that in light of the plain meaning of
“insurance” and “insurer,” and the insurance title’ definition of “insurance,” a self-insured employer under the
workers’ compensation laws was not an insurer for purposes of the guaranty act); Stamp v. Dept of Labor and
Industries, 859 P.2d 597, 599-601 (Wash. 1993) (deciding to follow other jurisdictions’ interpretation of “insurer” in
concluding that self-insured employers “are not reinsurers, insurers, insurance pools or underwriting associations”;
In re Mission Ins. Co., 816 P.2d 502, 505 (N.M. 1991) (holding that self-insured employers’ claims are “covered
claims” under the guaranty act because the excess insurance policies at issue were direct insurance and not
reinsurance); Iowa Cont. Wkrs’ Comp. v. Iowa Ins. Guar., 437 N.W.2d 909, 913-16 (Iowa 1989) (concluding that
the self-insurer’s excess workers’ compensation insurance was direct insurance, rather than reinsurance, because the
only insurance contract at issue was between the insolvent insurer and the group, as the “insurer’s relationship is
with the employer or the group of employers, and not with the individual employees”); Zinke-Smith, Inc. v. Florida
Insurance Guar. Ass’n, Inc., 304 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that, under the insurance title’s
definition of “insurer,” self-insured employers are not insurers for guaranty act purposes as such insurance policies
are not reinsurance, but rather, excess insurance”).

